당일폰테크 Wertheim: Trump’s ‘Naked Imperialism’ Leaves Allies Facing U.S. …
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작성자 이민종 작성일26-01-25 13:21 조회38회 댓글0건본문
Asked to choose words that best describe the Trump administration’s foreign policy over the past year, Stephen Wertheim, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, responded in an email interview with the Kyunghyang Daily News on January 19: “Thuggish. Extortionate. Frenzied. Myopic.” Wertheim is also a co-founder of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft and the author of Tomorrow, the World: The Birth of U.S. Global Supremacy, which Foreign Affairs selected as its “Book of the Year”.
Wertheim said that President Trump is “offering an enthusiastically naked imperialism,” adding that “even U.S. allies must now prepare to stand up to Washington’s bullying.”
KYUNGHYANG: The operation to capture Nicolas Maduro came as a shock in that it appeared to mark a return to an era in which “might makes right.” What do you believe the Trump administration’s attack on Venezuela signifies for the international order?
WERTHEIM: Trump’s attack on Venezuela is hardly the first time the United States has used military force aggressively and in violation of international law. What is different is that Trump makes little-to-no attempt even to claim he’s acting for a higher principle. He says his main motive for turning gunboats on Caracas is to “take the oil.” I believe him. He is currently threatening to strike multiple countries and annex the sovereign territory of other states, including NATO allies. He may well do that.
When they went to war, Trump’s predecessors not only claimed to be improving the international order; they also believed what they said — perhaps to a fault. But if traditional U.S. presidents sometimes allowed liberal ordering to turn into liberal imperialism, Trump is offering enthusiastically naked imperialism.
For the world, Trump’s conduct means that power politics has become an inescapable reality. Weak countries can count on Trump to boss them around. Even American allies must now prepare to stand up to Washington’s bullying. The effect on U.S. adversaries, namely China and Russia, remains to be seen; they don’t need America’s permission to act as they like. At a minimum, however, Trump has helped Beijing to present itself as the responsible steward of international order and more easily justify its own coercion, present and future. He has further lowered the bar Moscow needs to clear to appear less bad, in the eyes of many across the Global South, than the United States and the West.
KYUNGHYANG: President Trump has also suggested the possibility of using military force against Greenland. Following the bombing of Iranian nuclear facilities and the apparent success of the Venezuela operation, some argue that Trump may have developed a sense of confidence — or even efficacy — in the use of military force. How far do you think he may be willing to expand the use of force going forward?
WERTHEIM: Trump is emboldened. He has ordered a succession of attacks that might have caused immediate blowback but didn’t — so far. The trend began with his assassination of Iranian commander Qassem Soleimani in the last year of his first term. Now, in his second term, he has bombed Iran, blown up alleged drug boats in the Caribbean basin, and launched airstrikes in Syria and Nigeria, all before the raid to capture Maduro. Trump still prefers to take one-and-done military actions and avoid the commitment of ground forces. But he probably thinks that the doubters kept warning of risks, and each time he proved them wrong, avoiding the quagmires that bedeviled other presidents. I fear that his luck will run out, and he may order more and more ambitious operations.
KYUNGHYANG: Trump’s announcement of plans to impose tariffs on eight European Union countries that oppose the U.S. annexation of Greenland has pushed the transatlantic alliance into what many see as its gravest crisis to date. What do you believe the future holds for the transatlantic alliance and NATO?
WERTHEIM: Trump’s quest to annex Greenland has the potential not only to fracture the transatlantic alliance but to divide Europe as well. If Trump keeps intensifying pressure on Denmark to sell the territory, the European countries who rely the most on U.S. military protection may urge Copenhagen to appease Trump, while other European countries may find that prospect unconscionable. So Europe could effectively split into two camps, with the United States siding with one against the other.
However the Greenland affair turns out, NATO will never be the same. Major European countries, including France and Germany, have learned they cannot remain dependent on the United States — not under Trump and not after Trump. Not only is American power unreliable, but it is liable to turn into a dagger aimed at your heart. I can imagine several possible futures for the transatlantic alliance, but the next decade won’t look like the last.
KYUNGHYANG: For years, Latin America was treated as a low-priority region in major U.S. strategic documents. Yet in the Trump administration’s latest National Security Strategy, the Western Hemisphere is designated as a top strategic priority. Why do you think the Trump administration, unlike previous administrations, is placing such emphasis on the Western Hemisphere?
WERTHEIM: Consider three levels: Trump, his administration, and the world.
Trump has all along felt that the most grievous threats to the United States traverse the nation’s borders. Immigrants, gangs, drugs, and even, less directly, trade — Trump securitizes these issues and prioritizes them above conventional military threats far away. That worldview has put Trump on a collision course with America’s hemispheric neighbors.
Yet it’s only in his second presidency that the Western Hemisphere has ascended to the top of U.S. strategic priorities. That’s because Trump has finally surrounded himself with likeminded or obedient advisers willing to implement his vision. In part because his vision is capacious, his administration contains several factions who compete over most areas of foreign policy. On the Western Hemisphere, however, the factions overlap. “Primacists” such as Secretary of State Marco Rubio can agree with “restrainers,” who favor U.S. military pullbacks overseas, that the United States should show greater concern with challenges close to home.
And now that the United States has lost a position of dominance in Europe and Asia, the Western Hemisphere has reemerged as a fresh-seeming terrain in which to wield American power. Trump prefers to deal with the weak, and Trump isn’t alone: the United States has sought to achieve uncontested global supremacy ever since the Cold War ended. Today Washington can no longer enjoy the same position worldwide, but it can dominate what the Trump administration calls “our hemisphere.”
KYUNGHYANG: Trump and the MAGA movement have long been described as isolationist. Yet Trump has intervened extensively abroad, calling into question whether that label remains analytically useful. He once appeared to approach the use of power like a businessman weighing costs and returns, but he now seems increasingly willing to assert power for its own sake. How would you characterize the underlying logic or strategy of Trump’s foreign policy?
WERTHEIM: Trump has never been an isolationist; he wants to take things from the world, not withdraw from it. Nor does Trump make careful calculations of costs and benefits. He has always been a showman more than a businessman, and as president, he is guided above all by the performance of power. He wants to tell Americans, the world, and perhaps himself that he is in control and getting his way. More specifically, he is performing his vision of “peace through strength,” which involves both ending armed conflicts and using military force in targeted ways to display American might.
The irony is that Trump is supposed to put “America first” in all things, yet he lacks a coherent account of what American interests are. At least the original so-called isolationists of 1940 and 1941 had an identifiable understanding of U.S. interests: they contended that so long as the United States kept outside powers out of the Western Hemisphere, North America would remain secure from attack. They were not necessarily wrong on that point, even though their prescription might have been terrible for the world. Trump, by contrast, chafes at the global commitments he has inherited but has yet to relinquish any of them.
KYUNGHYANG: The new National Security Strategy(NSS) does not contain systemic criticism of China or Russia. Some analysts note that this is the first NSS since 1988 that does not reference China’s authoritarianism even once. What do you think this shift signifies?
WERTHEIM: The National Security Strategy makes almost no distinction between democratic and authoritarian states. Under Trump’s predecessors, however, the United States has opposed Russia and China not only because they were authoritarian, but also, and mainly, because they threaten American primacy, including U.S. allies.
The new National Security Strategy does not take the accommodating view of China that some analysts have suggested. True, it avoids adversarial verbiage toward China. Yet it offers Beijing no concessions — nothing but the chance to accept coexistence on Washington’s terms. In particular, the document states that Taiwan is strategically and economically important to the United States and promises to “build a military capable of denying aggression anywhere in the First Island Chain.” While it seems Trump wants to avoid needlessly antagonizing Beijing through rhetoric, U.S.-China competition is continuing.
KYUNGHYANG: But some experts argue that the era of hegemonic competition is coming to an end, and that the United States, China, and Russia may be moving toward a great-power arrangement that tacitly recognizes spheres of influence. Do you agree with this interpretation?
WERTHEIM: I essentially disagree. Trump has reclaimed America’s traditional sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere, but that does not mean he’s willing to grant China or Russia spheres in their own regions. The normal hypocrisy of U.S. foreign policy is: “spheres of influence for me, but not for thee.” If that hypocrisy hasn’t bothered other presidents, it certainly won’t bother Trump.
Trump has not offered to cede a sphere of influence to Beijing or Moscow in their regions. He hardly welcomed the expansion of Chinese power in the Indo-Pacific. Trump has, of course, supported Russia’s demand to retain the territory it currently occupies in Ukraine, plus the rest of the Donetsk region, but in that case Trump seems to be attempting to reach a pragmatic end to the war rather than grant Russia a wider sphere of influence in eastern Europe or Central Asia.
In short, Trump is asserting American power globally, not pulling the United States back to its own hemisphere. That said, Trump may yet make some sort of deal over Taiwan or diminish U.S. defense responsibilities in Europe. He may also weaken the foundations that generate American power over the long term, including the country’s international attractiveness and state capacity. In a decades’ time, the United States may well have a more modest global military presence and fewer defense commitments. But even if that happens, the United States will remain a major security player in Asia and the Western Hemisphere at a minimum, and I doubt that Russia could rampage through much of eastern Europe.
KYUNGHYANG: North Korea is not mentioned even once in the new NSS. This has led to speculation in South Korea that the United States may have effectively accepted the practical impossibility of North Korean denuclearization and downgraded the priority of the nuclear issue. What is your assessment?
WERTHEIM: As Barack Obama left office a decade ago, he told Trump that North Korea was the most pressing threat the new president would face. Since Trump failed to make a nuclear deal with Kim Jong-un in 2019, North Korea has dropped far down Washington’s list of foreign policy priorities. The new National Security Strategy reflects that reality.
In my view, the United States has all but accepted the practical impossibility of fully denuclearizing North Korea, even though it hasn’t officially said so. There is no realistic scenario in which North Korea will decide to relinquish its nuclear arsenal.
The Biden administration effectively sought to strengthen deterrence and manage risk, not to advance toward denuclearization. Trump personally seems to want to return to the negotiating table with Kim Jong-un as part of his attempt to be the “president of peace.” But there are no signs of what Trump would be willing to offer Kim, and Kim’s asking price, if there is one, has gone up due to his partnership with Russia and distrust of the United States.
KYUNGHYANG: The new NSS emphasizes that the United States will no longer bear security burdens unilaterally, calling on allies to share responsibility. It specifically highlights the roles of South Korea and Japan in the Indo-Pacific, including the defense of the First Island Chain. In the event of a contingency involving Taiwan, what strategic role does the United States expect South Korea to play?
WERTHEIM: I don’t think many people in the U.S. government expect South Korea to join a U.S.-led coalition to fight China. (Nor is it knowable whether the United States would fight China; “strategic ambiguity” isn’t just a policy but a real reflection of U.S. intention, or lack thereof.) Instead, South Korea would be expected to provide logistical support for allied forces and produce defense equipment to sustain the war effort. Most importantly, South Korea would need to assume the full burden of deterring North Korea even as some U.S. forces and assets on the Korean peninsula get diverted to the Taiwan theater.
KYUNGHYANG: I would like to ask about the Trump administration’s response to the recent tensions between China and Japan. While Prime Minister Takaichi’s comments about possible involvement in a Taiwan contingency may have been diplomatically awkward, they were broadly aligned with U.S. expectations regarding Japan’s security role. However, the Trump administration’s expressions of support for Japan were both muted in tone and notably delayed, giving the impression that Washington preferred to stand on the sidelines of this dispute.
WERTHEIM: The U.S. ambassador to Japan did express support for Japan and Takaichi, but Trump himself was muted. Trump’s response reflects his desire for stable relations with Beijing after the two countries had reached a fragile trade truce. In addition, Trump prefers to remain strictly ambiguous about how the United States itself would respond to a Chinese military attack on Taiwan. In the context of Taiwan as well as Ukraine, he seems to think it’s unwise for a weaker country to use inflammatory language that could provoke a stronger country. So it wouldn’t surprise me if Trump personally disapproved of Takaichi’s comments, which appeared to suggest that Japan would use military force if China used armed force to attack Taiwan.
Still, I don’t see a real change in U.S. policy so far. We’ll find out in the coming months if Trump and Xi are interested in reaching a new understanding about Taiwan.
오늘날 대한민국에서 카지노, 경마, 스포츠 토토로 대표되는 이른바 사행산업은 모순적인 지위에 놓여 있다. 국가는 이를 사회적 해악으로 규정하며 도덕적 낙인을 찍으면서도 동시에 재정 확보를 위해 독점적으로 운영하며 규제의 울타리 안에 가둬두고 있다. 하지만 이제 우리는 근본적인 질문을 던져야 한다. 불확실성에 도전하고 요행을 바라는 본능은 과연 제거해야 할 악인가, 아니면 문명 발전의 동력인 적응 기제인가.
생태학의 ‘위험 민감성 채집 이론’에 따르면 먹이가 부족한 극한 환경에서 동물은 예측 가능하지만 적은 양의 먹이보다, 불확실하더라도 풍부한 먹이가 있는 곳을 선택한다. 이는 도박이 아니라 생존을 위한 처절한 적응 전략이다. 인간 역시 전쟁과 격변의 역사 속에서 불확실성을 확률로 전환하며 문명을 일궈왔다. 즉, 사행성 본능은 불확실한 환경에서 살아남기 위한 인류의 신경심리학적 자산이다.
지금의 국가 주도 사행산업은 이용자의 전두엽을 마비시키고 보상 회로만 자극하는 비적응적 구조에 머물러 있다. 혁신의 핵심은 이를 불확실성 적응 게임으로 전환하는 데 있다.
안토니오 다마지오의 아이오와 도박 과제 실험이 증명하듯 인간은 신체 신호를 통해 불확실성 속에서 유리한 패턴을 찾아내는 능력이 있다. 미래형 카지노와 레저는 단순히 운에 돈을 거는 곳이 돼서는 안 된다. 이용자가 자신의 심박수와 뇌파 등 생체 신호를 확인하며, 감정을 다스리고 확률적 인지 능력을 키우는 신경심리학적 훈련장이 돼야 한다.
이를 실현하기 위해선 파격적인 제도 개편이 선행돼야 한다. 첫째, 도덕적 응징 중심의 사행산업감독위원회를 폐지하고 신경심리학과 AI 기술을 기반으로 한 사행성 도박 및 중독 게임 관리청(가칭)을 신설해야 한다. 둘째, 관료 중심의 폐쇄적 심의를 타파하고 AI 전문가, 신경심리학자, 시민사회가 참여하는 다자간 심의 시스템을 도입해야 한다. 셋째, 규제의 방향을 일괄적 억제에서 사회적 포용 및 명예 중심으로 바꿔야 한다. 리스크 관리 능력이 탁월한 이용자에게는 전략 전문가의 명예를 부여하고, 중독 징후자에게는 과학적인 인지 치료를 제공하는 방식이다.
오사카 복합 리조트 등 국제적 경쟁이 격화되는 시점에서 한국의 사행산업은 고사냐 혁신이냐의 기로에 서 있다. 카지노와 경마를 돈벌이를 위한 국가 독점 사업으로 방치하는 것은 공직자들의 무지이자 경제적 직무유기다.
우리는 이제 사행산업을 국민의 리스크 관리 역량을 키우고 우울과 스트레스를 달관의 기쁨으로 승화시키는 ‘고부가가치 인지 레저 산업’으로 재정의해야 한다. 불확실성을 위험의 확률로 전환하는 능력, 그것이 바로 인공지능 시대를 살아갈 인간의 가장 강력한 무기이기 때문이다. 국가 주도 사행산업의 혁신은 바로 그 지점에서 시작돼야 한다.
의정부소년보호사건변호사 분당불법촬영변호사 안산학교폭력변호사 이혼변호사 용인성범죄변호사 검사출신마약전문변호사 수원대형로펌 이혼전문변호사 부천이혼전문변호사 폰테크 폰테크당일 폰테크 수원상간소송변호사 명품레플리카사이트 웹사이트 상위노출 수원상간소송변호사 안양상간소송변호사 개인회생장기렌트 의정부변호사 성남성범죄전문변호사 용인강간변호사 경주이혼전문변호사 흥신소 수원법무법인 용인성추행변호사 청주센텀푸르지오자이 성남법무법인 코글플래닛 흥신소 폰테크 비아그라 지속시간 용인법무법인 분당강제추행변호사 인터넷티비현금많이주는곳 폰테크 의정부변호사 용인이혼변호사 용인이혼변호사 수원형사변호사 수원촉법소년변호사 수원상간소송변호사 용인이혼변호사 평택학교폭력변호사 평택이혼전문변호사 성남이혼변호사 양육권 폰테크 인터넷가입사은품많이주는곳 대구이혼전문변호사 평택학교폭력변호사 안양이혼전문변호사 폰테크. 무심사무보증장기렌트 성남상간소송변호사 의정부법률사무소 양주학교폭력변호사 상간녀위자료 부산폰테크 의정부음주운전변호사 빠른이혼 안산이혼전문변호사 홈페이지 상위노출 수원성범죄변호사 의정부형사변호사 이혼소송 인스타 팔로워 구매 평택학교폭력변호사 수원부장검사출신변호사 성남음주운전변호사 의정부형사전문변호사 인터넷가입 의정부형사전문변호사 용인음주운전변호사 조정이혼 무심사장기렌트카 피망머니상 성남음주운전변호사 구미이혼전문변호사 평택개인회생 의정부음주운전변호사 폰테크 인스타 팔로워 늘리기 용인법무법인 부장검사출신변호사 남양주음주운전변호사 휴대폰성지 폰테크 의정부음주운전변호사 성남성범죄전문변호사 브랜드이모티콘 저신용장기렌트카 의정부음주운전변호사 내구제 용인성추행변호사 안양상간소송변호사 웹사이트 상위노출 용인학교폭력변호사 폰테크 마약전문변호사 의정부형사전문변호사 비아그라 복용법 수원형사전문변호사 백링크 수원형사변호사 빠른이혼 수원형사전문변호사 수원학교폭력변호사 수원법무법인 이지렌트 말기암요양 의정부법률사무소 네이버검색광고 안양학교폭력변호사 서울탐정사무소 한게임클래식머니상 의정부학교폭력변호사 의정부이혼전문변호사 수원성범죄변호사 인스타그램 좋아요 구미이혼전문변호사 출장용접 안산음주운전변호사 성범죄변호사 수원법률사무소 구리학교폭력변호사 폰테크 수원이혼변호사 성남성범죄전문변호사 인스타 팔로워 구매 성남이혼변호사 저신용장기렌트카 폰테크 암요양병원 인스타그램 좋아요 늘리기 이혼소송 남양주법무법인 수원형사전문변호사 수원이혼전문변호사 인터넷티비현금많이주는곳 승소사례 천안이혼전문변호사 수원강간변호사 이혼전문변호사 용인상간소송변호사 창원이혼전문변호사 수원이혼전문변호사 의정부성범죄변호사 수원법률사무소 수원이혼전문변호사 성남상간소송변호사 비대면 폰테크 인터넷가입 수원음주운전변호사 포항이혼전문변호사 이혼변호사 용인이혼전문변호사 비대면 폰테크 수원형사변호사 경주이혼전문변호사 성남상간소송변호사 약 폰테크당일 수원소년범죄변호사 수원소년재판변호사 인터넷비교사이트 성남이혼변호사 당일폰테크 사이트 상위노출 김해이혼전문변호사 인스타 팔로워 구매 안양이혼전문변호사 서울이혼전문변호사 유방암요양병원 용평 스키렌탈 비아그라 처방 폰테크 의정부변호사 용인성범죄변호사 폰테크 수원강간변호사 의정부음주운전변호사 의정부이혼변호사 김해이혼전문변호사 용인불법촬영변호사 의정부형사전문변호사 폰테크 항암요양 남양주학교폭력변호사 신용회복장기렌트 수원이혼전문변호사 구리학교폭력변호사 남양주법무법인 수원성범죄변호사 이지렌트카 수원형사변호사 부산이혼전문변호사 의정부상간소송변호사 저신용자렌탈 의정부음주운전변호사 수원성범죄전문변호사 용인법무법인 의정부성범죄전문변호사 폰테크 부장검사출신변호사 분당불법촬영변호사 탐정사무소 용인상간소송변호사 웹사이트 상위노출 용인법무법인 수원성범죄전문변호사 인터넷가입사은품많이주는곳 수원변호사 안양이혼전문변호사 의정부학교폭력변호사 폰테크 국어시험 이혼전문변호사추천 성남대형로펌 용인성추행변호사 용인불법촬영변호사 안양이혼전문변호사 인천이혼전문변호사 연체자장기렌트 성범죄전문변호사 의정부소년재판변호사 용인형사전문변호사 남양주이혼전문변호사 수원강제추행변호사 신용불량자렌트 의정부변호사 창원이혼전문변호사 폰테크 수원음주운전변호사 폰테크 성남성범죄전문변호사 수원이혼변호사 홈페이지 상위노출 출장용접 유방암 수면음악 1시간 의정부법무법인 수원법률사무소 장기렌트카 폰테크 안산이혼전문변호사 용인학교폭력변호사 부천이혼전문변호사 수원이혼변호사 인터넷티비현금많이주는곳 인터넷설치현금 안산이혼전문변호사 의정부이혼전문변호사 포항이혼전문변호사 폰테크 분당성추행변호사 폰테크 수원변호사 분당강제추행변호사 용인상간소송변호사 분당불법촬영변호사 용인성범죄전문변호사 안양학교폭력변호사 폰테크 의정부법무법인 성남성범죄전문변호사 수원법무법인 인터넷가입 의정부성범죄전문변호사 수원강간변호사 폰테크 홈페이지 성남상간소송변호사 서울이혼전문변호사 수원상간녀변호사 승소사례 수원형사변호사 대구이혼전문변호사 수원성추행변호사 남양주음주운전변호사 세종이혼전문변호사 의정부형사변호사 양육권 위자료 비아그라 사이트 수원음주운전변호사 양주학교폭력변호사 의정부학교폭력변호사 수원형사전문변호사 재산분할 서울이혼전문변호사 안양상간소송변호사 의정부학교폭력변호사 빠른이혼 수원상간소송변호사 평택이혼전문변호사 수원상간소송변호사 광주폰테크 수원음주운전변호사 분당강간변호사 출장용접 세종이혼전문변호사 의정부대형로펌 사이트 상위노출 사이트 상위노출 용인성범죄변호사 이혼전문변호사 폰테크 의정부법률사무소 부천이혼전문변호사 의정부학교폭력변호사 수원검사출신변호사 용인불법촬영변호사 평택학교폭력변호사 인천탐정사무소 의정부대형로펌 이지렌트카 비아그라 효능 한게임머니상 의정부형사전문변호사 분당강제추행변호사 수원강제추행변호사 의정부학교폭력변호사 수원형사전문변호사 용인형사변호사 폰테크 수원법률사무소 한게임머니상 폰테크 사이트 상간녀위자료 수원형사전문변호사 용인이혼전문변호사 인스타 팔로워 수원강간변호사 양산이혼전문변호사 인터넷가입현금지원 의정부상간녀변호사 저신용무보증장기렌트카 김해이혼전문변호사 분당강제추행변호사 안양이혼전문변호사 용인형사전문변호사 상조내구제 울산이혼전문변호사 평택이혼전문변호사 수원음주운전변호사 구미이혼전문변호사 부천이혼전문변호사 저신용자장기렌트 인터넷가입현금지원 인터넷티비현금많이주는곳 기업판촉물 수원형사변호사 수원형사전문변호사 인터넷가입현금지원 용인법무법인 청주이혼전문변호사 수원법무법인 안산이혼전문변호사 이혼소송 이혼전문변호사 이지렌터카 성남학교폭력변호사 의정부형사전문변호사 이혼상담 수원형사전문변호사 안양학교폭력변호사 구리학교폭력변호사 폰테크 네이버 홈페이지 상위노출 당일폰테크 수원불법촬영변호사 수원음주운전변호사 용인법무법인 수원상간소송변호사 세종이혼전문변호사 수원이혼전문변호사 용인음주운전변호사 화이자 비아그라수원법률사무소 수원이혼전문변호사 남양주대형로펌 폰테크 안산음주운전변호사 용인상간소송변호사 수원상간소송변호사 울산이혼전문변호사 분당강간변호사 자동차장기리스 양주학교폭력변호사 인터넷가입현금지원 ai헤어모델 안산학교폭력변호사 수원음주운전변호사 이혼변호사 상조내구제 의정부형사전문변호사 성남대형로펌 SNS마케팅 사이트 상위노출 수원마약전문변호사 인스타그램 좋아요 구매 경주이혼전문변호사 수원탐정사무소 웹사이트 상위노출 상간소송변호사 수원상간소송변호사 안양대형로펌 창원이혼전문변호사 용인형사변호사 의정부이혼전문변호사 인터넷가입현금지원 안산음주운전변호사 서울이혼전문변호사 용인학교폭력변호사 수원이혼전문변호사 수면유도음악 안산이혼전문변호사 상간남소송 웹사이트 상위노출 용인이혼전문변호사 포항이혼전문변호사





